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This paper examines how policies regulating the cross-border movement and domestic use of electronic 
data on the internet impact the productivity of firms in sectors relying on electronic data. In doing so, 
we collect regulatory information on a group of developed economies and create an index that measures 
the regulatory restrictiveness of each country’s data policies. The index is based on observable policy 
measures that explicitly inhibit the cross-border movement and domestic use of data. Using cross-
country firm-level and industry-level data, we analyse econometrically the extent to which these data 
regulations over time impact the productivity performance of downstream firms and industries 
respectively. We show that stricter data policies have a negative and significant impact on the 
performance of downstream firms in sectors reliant on electronic data. This adverse effect is stronger 
for countries with strong technology networks, for servicified firms, and holds for several robustness 
checks. 
Keywords 




Between 2000 and 2015, global traffic of data over the internet rose by a factor of 863. This represented 
an annual compound growth rate of 62.1 percent (Figure 1). For many firms the amplified use of data 
has become an essential element of the production processes in the current digital era, aiming to increase 
their economic performance. At the same time, many governments have started to regulate the use and 
transfer of data over the internet. These policies are likely to have an impact on the productivity 
performance of firms.  
This paper investigates whether measures regulating electronic data have an impact on firms’ 
productivity. We do so by employing a cross-country analysis over time of policy measures on the use 
and transfer of data for a group of developed economies. To our understanding, this paper makes a 
unique contribution to the literature by showing how regulatory policies on data have an impact on the 
firm’s productivity performance. In particular, we assess how stricter data policies affect the firm’s 
productivity in downstream sectors relying on data. Our policy frameworks on data across countries 
cover both how the flow of data across borders and the domestic use of data are regulated.  
Investigating the relationship between the regulatory approaches countries apply on the domestic use 
and cross-border transfer of data and the performance of downstream firms requires three novel datasets 
that we have uniquely developed. These are (a) information on how restrictive countries are regarding 
the domestic use and cross-border transfer of electronic data, (b) a measure of cross-country 
performance of firms and finally (c) an indicator measuring the extent to which sectors use data as part 
of their production process.  
Regarding the first set of information, we have created a quantifiable and detailed set of policy 
information on the regulatory framework of 64 economies towards the use and cross-border transfer of 
data as developed in Ferracane et al. (2018). This comprehensive dataset contains extensive information 
on the state and history of data policies. This information on data policies has been condensed into a 
composite (weighted) time-varying policy index for each country covered. The data policy index takes 
on values ranging between 0 (completely open) to 1 (virtually closed) with intermediate scores reflecting 
varying degrees of applied policy restrictions on the use and cross-border transfer of data. The creation 
of this database together with its corresponding index represents in itself a major contribution to the 
existing literature, which can be used for future research in this area.  
For our second set of information on the performance of firms, we use consistent firm-level data over 
a group of developed economies from the ORBIS database. In particular, we exploit the TFP estimate 
recently developed by Ackerberg et al. (2015) which has been applied in various studies such as Arnold 
et al. (2015) and Fernades and Paunov (2012). The productivity literature has put forward several 
empirical methodologies for constructing a credible TFP indicator with estimation strategies from Olley 
and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) as the most commonly used ones. The TFP measure 
by Ackerberg et al. (2015) improves on the previous two approaches by addressing their collinearity 
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problem. In this paper, we use this Ackerberg TFP estimate throughout all our regressions, but also 
perform robustness checks with the alternative TFP proxies to compare the results, including Hsieh and 
Klenow’s (2014; 2009) TFPR and TFPQ measures.  
Finally, our third set of information is an indicator measuring the extent to which different sectors 
use data as part of their production process. This indicator links up the cross-country TFP estimates of 
firms and the index on countries’ data policies with input shares that measure the reliance on data for 
each sector. This identification strategy weights each country’s state of data policies with each sectors’ 
dependence on data as an input. The use of data for each sector is computed in an exogenous manner by 
taking detailed input-output coefficients from a country not part of our analysis, namely the US. 
Employing this methodology assumes that sectors which employ comparatively more data in their 
production process are more affected by the changes in data policies.  
We perform our analysis in a cross-country panel setting. The results show that stricter more 
restrictive data policies do indeed have a significant negative impact on the productivity performance of 
firms in downstream data-intense sectors. In addition, we find that this negative impact is stronger for 
countries with a better digital-enabling environment and for manufacturing firms that also produce 
services. Moreover, the results are robust when correcting for other regulatory policies in services 
sectors following Arnold et al. (2015; 2011). In the analysis, we apply the appropriate fixed effects and 
control variables, and take account of the potential reverse causality by applying a lag between the time 
of implementation of the data policies and the measurement of firms’ productivity. In addition, we also 
split out our main index of data policies into different types of policies, namely policies that affect the 
domestic use of data and the ones that affect the cross-border movement of data to see whether the two 
individual sub-indexes have a different impact on firm productivity.  
Our work contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, to our knowledge, we are the first 
to create a dataset in which the regulatory framework of countries regarding data has been quantified 
from a descriptive into a measurable index. Although existing works have undertaken a similar exercise 
with respect to other regulatory policies on services (Arnold et al., 2015) or more generally on non-tariff 
barriers (Kee et al., 2009), to date no work has made a similar effort for data policies. Second, we relate 
our policy index to micro-level data on the productivity performance of firms across a group of 
countries. This departs from much of the previous research that is based on a single country and allows 
us to exploit cross-country differences as an additional source of variation. It also allows us to use 
industry-year fixed effects to control for possible changes. Furthermore, having a group of countries 
makes it possible to extrapolate policy conclusions across countries. Third, we provide robust evidence 
on the way in which these data-related policies affect the productivity of firms that are more dependent 
on data.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the previous literature 
regarding the use and cross-border transfer of data and their related economic effects. Section 3 
elaborates on the three sets of data used in this paper. It also provides some descriptive analysis on how 
the use of data in different sectors relates to productivity. Section 4 presents the estimation strategy and 
Section 5 reviews the estimation results. Finally, the last section concludes by putting the results in a 
wider context.  
2. Related Literature 
This paper closely relates to the previous literature on the effect of restrictive services policies on 
downstream firm productivity such as Arnold et al. (2015; 2011). In line with their work on services, 
the identification strategy in this paper weighs an index on restrictive data policies by the share of input 
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use of data for each downstream sector. This value is then regressed on firm-level TFP.1 The reason for 
using a similar methodology is that policy restrictions on data relate closely to services regulation as 
many digital services depend on the use and transfer of data for their business. For instance, Opresnik 
and Taisch (2015) show that data is generated through the use of services in the production processes of 
firms and that this data is exploited in later stages of the production process for more innovative activities 
and new services for consumers. This allows for an increased value extraction using big data and, as a 
result, data-related services become increasingly an essential factor to improve the firms’ productivity.2  
This paper takes a similar line. More restrictive data policies are expected to have an adverse effect 
on downstream firms in sectors that depend on data in their production process. Today many firms in 
data-intense sectors rely heavily on data and therefore policies that restrict the use and cross-border 
transfer of data are expected to reduce their efficiency and eventually productivity. Yet, data policies 
have only come under the spotlight in recent years as a consequence of the widespread adoption of cloud 
computing services and the increased cross-border provision of services over the internet.  
The empirical research on data policies and firms’ productivity is relatively scarce. To the best of 
our knowledge, van der Marel et al. (2016) is the only study that explores how regulatory policies related 
to electronic data affect TFP, albeit at an industry-level. The authors make a first attempt at analysing 
this linkage econometrically by setting up a data regulatory index using existing indices of services 
regulation. They calculate the costs of data policies for domestic firms by establishing a link between 
regulation in data services and TFP at the industry-level in downstream sectors across a small set of 
countries. They find that stricter data policies tend to have a stronger negative impact on the downstream 
performance of industries that are more data-intense. They also employ their econometric results in a 
general equilibrium analysis using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) to estimate the wider 
macroeconomic impact. 
Other studies have looked specifically at one policy framework regarding data, namely the EU 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Christensen et al. (2013) uses calibration techniques to 
evaluate the impact of the GDPR proposal on small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and 
concludes that SMEs that use data rather intensively are likely to incur substantial costs in complying 
with these new rules. The authors compute this result using a simulated dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model and show that up to 100,000 jobs could disappear in the short-run and more than 
300,000 in the long-run. Another study by Bauer et al. (2013) uses a computable general equilibrium 
GTAP model to estimate the economic impact of the GDPR and finds that this law could lead to losses 
up to 1.3 percent of the EU’s GDP as a result of a reduction of trade between the EU and the rest of the 
world. 
Our study builds on these aforementioned works by bringing new contributions. First of all, we 
contribute to the general literature on services regulation by focusing on one particular policy area, 
namely restrictions related to the domestic use and cross-border movement of data. Currently, many 
data flow disciplines are being discussed as part of various negotiations at the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and regional trade agreements. Yet, to date no thorough empirical study has undertaken an effort 
to find a significant effect of these measures on productivity and trade. Second, we construct a regulatory 
index measuring the restrictiveness of data policies. The data policy index considers a set of policies 
                                                     
1 Other previous works that employ similar identification strategy with firm-level productivity data in a services context are 
Fernades and Paunov (2012) and Duggan et al. (2013) with each using a different TFP proxy.  
2 Recent work by Goldfarb and Trefler (2018) discus the potential theoretical implications of data policies such as data 
localisation and privacy regulations on trade although this is put in a broader context of Artificial Intelligence (AI). 
Nonetheless, the authors do make clear that an expanded AI industry in which data flows are an important factor would 
have clear implications for trade in services. Similarly, Goldfarb and Tucker (2012) point out that privacy regulations may 
harm innovative activities by presenting the results of previous studies undertaken with respect to two services sectors, 
namely in health services and online advertising. Both studies show that there are strong linkages between the effective 
sourcing and use of data, services sectors and services trade. 
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that impose a substantial cost on the use and cross-border movement of data and are therefore expected 
to increase the costs for the provision of downstream goods and services. In turn, this would have an 
impact on the productivity of the firm, which we measure with firm-level data.  
Building on this approach, this paper follows Iootty et al. (2016) which uses cross-country 
productivity data of firms covering a wide set of developed economies using ORBIS to come up with 
several firm-level TFP measures of productivity. Gal and Hijzen (2016), among others, also use cross-
country firm-level data of productivity sourced from the same ORBIS database to measure the economic 
performance of firms. However, in their paper, the authors use a broader measure of output performance 
whereas we specifically employ TFP. Moreover, both Iootty et al. (2016) and Gal and Hijzen (2016) 
analyse the productivity impact of a wider set of policy measures of overall product market reform or in 
services and not of data policies in particular.  
In short, our study combines all aforementioned works by using an identification strategy similar to 
Arnold et al. (2015; 2011) but applied to data policies, for a wider set of countries and by developing 
specific cross-country TFP performance at the firm level.  
3. The Data 
To perform our empirical analysis, we need three sets of data: a regulatory index for the use and cross-
border transfer of data; a measure of TFP performance at the firm level; and input-output coefficients 
measuring the extent to which downstream (manufacturing and services) sectors use data as inputs. 
These input-output coefficients are then interacted with the data policy index to have a weighted score 
of regulatory restrictiveness. 
3.1 Data Policy Index  
The first essential ingredient for our analysis is a quantifiable and detailed set of policy information on 
countries’ regulatory framework on data. We draw on a comprehensive new database of data policies 
recently released by the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) to estimate our 
data policy index.3 The policies used for the analysis are those considered to create a cost for firms 
relying on data for their businesses. The criteria for listing a certain policy measure in the database are 
the following: (i) it creates a more restrictive regime for online versus offline users of data; (ii) it implies 
a different treatment between domestic and foreign users of data; and (iii) it is applied in a manner 
considered disproportionately burdensome to achieve a certain policy objective.  
Starting from the database, these policies are aggregated into an index using a detailed weighting 
scheme adapted from Ferracane et al. (2018) and presented in detail in Annex A.4 We expand the index 
released by Ferracane et al. (2018), which covered only the years 2016/2017, to create a panel for the 
years 2006-2017 that we can use in our regressions. In addition, the database and the index have been 
updated with new regulatory measures found in certain countries.  
To build up the index, each policy measure identified in any of the categories receives a score that 
varies between 0 (completely open) and 1 (virtually closed) according to how vast its scope is. A higher 
score represents a higher level of restrictiveness in data policies. While certain data policies can be 
                                                     
3 The authors have contributed to the development of the database at ECIPE. The dataset comprises 64 economies and is 
publicly available on the website of the ECIPE at the link: www.ecipe.org/dte/database. Besides analysing the 28 EU 
member states and the EU economy as a single entity, this database also covers Argentina, Australia, Brunei, Canada, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United States and Vietnam.  
4 The authors have previously used this categorisation in Ferracane et al. (2018). 
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legitimate and necessary to protect non-economic objectives such as the privacy of the individual or to 
ensure national security, these policies nevertheless create substantial costs for businesses and are 
therefore listed in the database. 
After applying our weighting scheme, the data policy index also varies between 0 (completely open) 
and 1 (virtually closed). The higher the index, the stricter the data policies implemented in the countries. 
Moreover, the index is broken down into two sub-indexes that cover two main types of policy measures 
that we analyse in this paper: one sub-index that covers policies on the cross-border movement of data 
and one sub-index covers policies on the domestic use of data. Analysing these two sub-indexes 
separately provides additional information on whether the impact of data policies on firms’ productivity 
varies according to the nature of the policies. The full data policy index is measured as the sum of these 
two sub-indexes. The list of measures included in the two sub-indexes is summarised in Table 1 and the 
specific weight for each measure is given in the last column. Table 2 shows the values of the data policy 
index and the two sub-indexes for the year 2017. 
As shown in Table 1, the sub-indexes are measures as a weighted average of different types of 
measures. The weights are intended to reflect the level of restrictiveness of the types of measures in 
terms of costs for the firm. The first sub-index on cross-border data flows covers three types of measures, 
namely (i) a ban to transfer data or a local processing requirement for data; (ii) a local storage 
requirement, and (iii) a conditional flow regime. The second sub-index covers a series of subcategories 
of policies affecting the domestic use of data. These are: (i) data retention requirements, (ii) subject 
rights on data privacy, (iii) administrative requirements on data privacy, (iv) sanctions for non-
compliance, and finally, (v) other restrictive practices related to data policies.  
Figure 2 shows how the two sub-indexes and the overall data policy index have evolved over time 
between the years 2006 and 2016. Each line is a (weighted) average of the 64 countries covered in this 
study. As one can see, there is a clear upward trend reflecting the fact that all types of data policies are 
becoming stricter over time. Note that measures affecting the cross-border data flows can directly inhibit 
the free flow of data across countries and therefore can directly restrict trade in services. On the other 
hand, measures belonging to the second sub-index on the domestic use of data only indirectly affect the 
flow of data across borders and therefore are expected to create costs for trade only indirectly.  
3.2 Firm-level Performance 
The firm-level data for estimating our TFP measures is retrieved from the ORBIS database from Bureau 
van Dijk (BvD). Although our aim is to include as many developed countries as possible that are covered 
by our index, unfortunately, ORBIS does not report all variables needed to calculate TFP for all 64 
countries. Moreover, some smaller states such as Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus have only few 
observations. Therefore, we limit the analysis to EU countries, Japan and Korea.5 Data in ORBIS is 
substantially improved from 2005 onwards. As said before, both manufacturing and services firms are 
considered in our computations to take stock of the wider downstream economy. Most services sectors 
are relatively more dependent on data in terms of creating value-added than manufacturing industries, 
which is the main reason why they are included. See Table B1 in Annex B for a yearly overview of firm 
observations for services and goods.  
One word of caution is warranted for our firm-level observations. Although we would prefer to have 
an entirely balanced panel dataset with only surviving firms, in our case this wish appears to be difficult. 
Our preferred time frame is 2006-2015 which covers a less than perfect panel format of surviving firms. 
Moreover, ORBIS provides a poor track of firms that enter and exit. In case we were to use only 
surviving firms with a shorter time frame after 2010, our observations would drop by 60 percent. In 
                                                     
5 The non-EU countries allow us to compare the impact of data regulations in developed economies outside the EU. This is 
particularly relevant given that the EU member states have, to some extent, a similar set of data policies. 
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large part, this is due to the few firms that are actually consistently present in ORBIS. Therefore, we 
prefer to work with data starting in 2006. Moreover, the policy trends across our sample of countries 
become visible after 2006, which provides a good opportunity to exploit the variation in policy changes, 
albeit with the trade-off of an unbalanced panel dataset.  
Firm-level TFP measures can be computed in different ways. Over the years, various methodologies 
have been developed in the literature that have been taken up in recent empirical works. TFP measures 
by Olley and Pakes (2003) (O&P) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2008) (L&P) are the most commonly used. 
More recently, several papers that are close to our line of research such as Fernandes and Paunov (2012) 
and Arnold et al. (2015) have instead used the TFP estimation developed by Ackerberg et al. (2015) 
(ACF). Although all three approaches correct for the endogeneity of input choices, including the choice 
of services as inputs, Ackerberg et al. (2015) improves the former two methods by correcting for 
potential collinearity problems. This problem could otherwise occur from a distorting factor with regards 
to the identification of the variable input coefficients. Ackerberg et al. (2015) also provide correction 
for the timing of input choice decision.  
This estimation approach is also preferred in our paper and we use it in all our regressions. To obtain 
TFP, one needs to estimate production functions. Since we are dealing with multiple countries and 
multiple industries, we estimate these production functions for each 2-digit NACE Rev. 2 sector and by 
country. This allows for industries and countries to differ in their production technology. In some cases, 
we regroup countries and industries due to their insufficient number of observations.6 In total there are 
52 industry groupings that can be seen in Table B2 and B3 in Annex B together with an overview of 
firm observations.7 Table B4 reports the number of firm observations by the 18 country groupings.  
To start estimating the production functions we need firm-level data on value-added. Normally, firm-
level value-added is defined as sales minus the value of intermediate inputs, which includes materials, 
services and energy. In ORBIS, unfortunately, only operating net revenue and material costs are reported 
and therefore we are bound to use these two variables to compute value-added.  
Moreover, materials are not reported for any firm for some European countries.8 For these countries, 
we use proxy material inputs. The way we do so is based on Basu et al. (2009) in which the authors 
compute materials as operational revenue minus operational profits, wages and depreciation. Since this 
is a less precise measure of material inputs, we check whether a strong correlation exists between both 
measures: the direct and proxied approach for all countries that report the two methods. Table B5 reports 
the regressions as correlations of the indirect measure on materials reported directly for these countries. 
The result shows that correlations are very strong with a high R-squared. Once we use this method of 
proxy, the number of firms in our dataset increases by 11 percent.9 
The production functions themselves are estimated using the standard approach of Cobb-Douglas in 
logarithmic form, as shown in the following equation:  
                                                     
6 The country groupings are the following: Germany with Austria, the Benelux, Sweden with Denmark, Estonia with Latvia, 
and finally the UK with Ireland. The reason for choosing these groupings is each pair is fairly like-minded in their economic 
structures. Regarding sector division, in total we have 57 different sectors, which is considerably more than in previous 
studies. This is because the high number of firm observations in each sector allows us to go ahead with this selection, 
although some industries are also regrouped together. 
7 An interesting minor detail is that the frequency share of firm observations between services and goods closely follows 
their value-added composition in GDP which in 2014 for goods was 24.3 percent whilst for services this figure was 74 
percent according to the World Development Indicators.  
8 These countries are Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, Malta and the UK. In addition to the European countries, 
we also include Korea and Japan in our analysis.  
9 Note, however, that ORBIS reports only 39 firm observations for Malta and the country is therefore not included in the 
final dataset. Furthermore, firms from Greece, Cyprus and Lithuania have neither reported nor proxied materials in ORBIS 
and are therefore also excluded from any further analysis in this paper. Table B6 provides the list of countries used in the 
analysis.  
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𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝐾 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝐿 ∙ 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡    (1) 
In equation (1), 𝑌𝑖𝑡 stands for value-added output of a firm i in year t and represents the variable of 
value-added as explained above with the caveats described. 𝐾𝑖𝑡 denotes the capital stock of a firm and 
is calculated based on the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM) using real fixed tangible assets, whilst 𝐿𝑖𝑡 
designates the labour input of a firm, which is proxied by the number of employees. Furthermore, 𝜔𝑖𝑡 
is the unobserved total factor productivity and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the random iid shock. As explained in the 
introduction of this section, we do not use OLS to estimate equation (1) as this estimation strategy suffers 
from simultaneity bias in its inputs. Instead, we use the approach from Ackerberg et al. (2015). For this 
specification, the material inputs are used as a proxy to obtain for unobserved time-varying productivity 
(𝜔𝑖𝑡).  
Of note, we deflate all three variables from nominal into deflated values first and then put them in 
Euros using constant 2010 exchange rates. Data on prices for EU countries come from Eurostat’s 
National Accounts database, and for Japan and Korea from OECD Structural Analysis database (STAN). 
Our deflators are mostly available at the 2-digit NACE industries. In case price data are missing, we use 
either a higher level of aggregation or otherwise simple GDP deflators. For value-added, we use the 
value-added in gross price index (i.e. implicit deflator) in constant prices with 2010 as the reference year 
for all countries. For materials, we use a deflator for intermediate consumption and finally for capital 
stock we use the consumption of fixed capital price index.  
The parameters 𝛽𝐾 and 𝛽𝐿 of the production functions are estimated separately by 18 countries times 
52 sectors. This provides us with a total of 936 production functions.10 They are estimated only with 
firms that consistently report values for at least four years, in order to remain in line with previous works. 
All in all, based on the unbiased Ackerberg approach sets of estimates, we obtain a firm-level, country-
specific, time-varying logarithmic TFP estimates. In Annex B, Table B7 provides summary statistics for 
the variables used in equation (1) production function whilst Tables B8 and B9 show summary statistics 
for all our TFP estimates.  
3.3 Input-Output Coefficients of Data 
The extent to which different sectors are using data as an input is measured through US input-output 
Use tables from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). These input-output matrices are at the 6-digit 
NAICS level, which allows us to identify at a disaggregated level those sectors that are more reliant on 
data as part of our identification strategy. Another motivation for using US tables is that the US is not 
included as part of our firm-level data. This makes our input coefficients on data use exogenous. There 
is a debate in the economic literature about whether one should use the assumption of equal industry 
technologies across countries or not. Equal technology coefficients seem reasonable if one thinks that 
the countries selected in the sample are reasonably similar in their economic structures and technology 
endowments.11 This is likely to be true in our case as we are dealing with developed economies only.  
In computing these data input coefficients, or data-intensities, we must first determine the sectors 
that provide data services to other downstream sectors. Table 3 lists these sectors which we call “data 
producers”. They are sectors that deploy a high intensity of electronic data when providing services. As 
such, these sectors act as an input of data to other sectors of the economy. This selection of sectors 
                                                     
10 An overview of this matrix with the number of firms in each of these cells is available upon request. Of note, the production 
functions were estimated twice: first using the approach of proxy materials and then, second, with reported materials. 
However, throughout our regressions we use the proxy materials as results do not differ between the two approaches. 
11 Practically, this might as well form a convenient assumption if a suspicion exists that input-output tables at country level 
are not very well measured for some economies. This could be the case for less developed countries which suffer from 
weak reporting capacities. 
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follows van der Marel et al. (2016) and is in line with Jorgenson et al. (2011) regarding IT-producing 
and using industries.12 The selected sectors include, inter alia, telecommunication; data processing, 
hosting and related services; internet service providers and web search portals; software publishers; 
computer system design services and other computer-related services.  
We calculate data services intensities for each downstream manufacturing and services sector at the 
6-digit level in two ways. The first is the ratio of the value of data services inputs over labour of each 
downstream sector, while the second consists in the share of data services inputs that each sector uses 
as part of its total input based on purchaser’s prices. These latter input shares are referred to in the 
economic literature as backward linkages.13 The inputs share over labour ratios are more in line with 
factor intensities put forward in the comparative advantage literature (e.g. Chor, 2011; Nunn, 2007). 
Labour is sourced from the US Bureau of Labour Statistics in NAICS for the same year and is matched 
with the US BEA input-output matrix which fits neatly. Our preferred proxy for intensities is the ratio 
of data input use over labour which is used in our baseline regression, but the inputs shares are also used 
as part of our robustness checks.  
Table 4 provides an overview of the Top 10 sector with the highest and lowest ratios of data-
intensities over labour by 2-digit NACE Rev.2, whereas Table 5 presents a similar Top 10 list of the 
data-intense services based on input shares. The reason for re-classifying these input-coefficients is that 
our firm-level data is provided in NACE. Since no concordance table currently exists between the 
original 6-digit BEA IO code table to the 6-digit NAICS and then to the 4-digit NACE, we have 
developed our own table and aggregated these data input coefficients at the 2-digit level for both types 
of intensities.14 Note that for some 4-digit NACE sectors, input coefficients are still missing after 
concording. To complete the reclassification, we take the average of all other 4-digit NACE sectors that 
belong to the same 2-digit sector. In the few cases where input data is not available at the 4-digit level, 
we take data from one or two levels higher up in the classification table, namely for the 3 or 2-digit 
NACE sectors, and compute the average.15  
As shown in Tables 4 and 5, sectors relying the most on data as inputs, which we define as “data 
users”, include unsurprisingly sectors such as telecommunications, information services and computer 
programming services. These data producing sectors are also the highest data using sectors. However, 
somewhat less obvious sectors are also listed as intense data users such as retail trade or real estate 
services. Other sectors that are found to be data-intense are head office services and management 
consultancy services, programming and broadcasting, and professional, scientific and technical services. 
We also find financial and insurance services are data-intense sectors, which is in line with the fact that 
these sectors are also technology-intensive. On the other side of the spectrum, we find sectors such as 
construction, tobacco products, wearing apparel, coke and petroleum, beverage and food products rely 
the least on data as inputs.  
3.4 Descriptive Analysis 
Using these two types of data-intensities, we come up with some preliminary analytical intuitions on the 
direction of the relationship between data-intensities and productivity. Figure 2 plots these two variables 
in which, on the horizontal axis, our preferred TFP measure is averaged over each 2-digit NACE sector 
                                                     
12 Furthermore, this selection of data-producing sectors is also in line with the Internet Association’s definition of internet 
sectors as described in Siwek (2017). 
13 Moreover, one additional reason to look at the input-side of data and data-related services is that the recent economic 
literature connects the potential growth and productivity performance of countries notably to the input use of data and 
digital services in the wider economy. See Jorgenson et al. (2011). 
14 Note that in the actual regressions we use data-intensities at 4-digit NACE level.  
15 We also computed the median in addition to the mean and used these intensities in our empirical estimations which 
produced similar results. The self-constructed concordance table is available upon request.  
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(across all countries) whilst the vertical axis gives the ratio of data use over labour. In this figure, a 
positive association between the two variables appears, which indicates that sectors which are more 
data-intense, and therefore more reliant on data-use in their production, are also the ones that show 
higher TFP rates. Note that retail services and tobacco products are excluded from this sample (but not 
in the regressions) because they are extreme outliers. On the whole, however, one can see that various 
services are very productive whilst also having a high share of data inputs. Other sectors such as 
beverages or the rubber and plastics industry show low TFP rates and also have lower shares of data-
inputs.  
Figure 3 replicates Figure 2 but now exclusively focuses on services sectors. This figure again shows 
a positive association between TFP and data-intensities. Services such as telecommunications, 
publishing activities, but also employment services or head office and consultancy services, are assessed 
as most data-intense whilst also displaying a higher level of TFP. On the one hand, the fact that these 
services are the most productive is not entirely surprising as they are services that represent the most 
dynamic segment the services economy over the last decade. On the other hand, some traditional 
services such as land or freight rail transport or postal services are shown to be the least productive in 
terms of TFP and also exhibit a low share of data-intensity. Note that the low productivity of these 
services sectors could also reflect their regulatory setting which is still relatively restrictive in many 
countries in our sample.  
Similar scatter plots are developed in Figure 4 but now using the share of data use in total input use. 
The left-hand panel in this figure shows the correlation between this intensity and TFP when taking 
goods and services together, whilst the right-hand panel shows this relationship for services only. Again, 
in both panels there is a positive relationship, suggesting that more data-intense sectors generally have 
higher productivity levels. This result somehow stands in contrast with the general notion that services 
suffer from ailing productivity in most developed economies and that they are less productive compared 
to manufacturing. To perform a robustness check, Figure 5 repeats the previous scatter plots using both 
types of data-intensities but this time using labour productivity (i.e. value-added over labour). A weaker 
association between data input over labour appears in the left-hand panel, while the relationship becomes 
negative when using data shares in the right-hand panel. The latter panel suggests that goods industries 
show higher labour productivity than many services sectors whilst being less data-intense. 
4. Empirical Strategy 
This section sets out the empirical strategy. First, we develop a so-called data linkage variable. This 
variable is calculated by weighting the regulatory data policy index used for our regressions with the 
input coefficients of data-intensities for each sector. Then, in a second step, we present our baseline 
specification for the regressions.  
4.1 Data Linkage 
The empirical estimation strategy follows the one pioneered by Arnold et al. (2011; 2015) and is used 
in several other papers with the purpose of creating a so-called services linkage index. In our case, we 
develop a data linkage index. For each country, we interact the input coefficient of data input reliance 
for each downstream sector with the country-specific data policy index. This is an identification strategy 
that relies on the assumption that sectors more reliant on data as inputs are also those which are more 
affected by changes in data policies. This weighted approach of data policy regulation that relies on data 
intensities is, in our view, a more just approach to measure the impact of data policies on TFP in contrast 
to an unweighted one.  
For this reason, each of the three country-specific data policy indexes presented in Section 3 (i.e. the 
full data policy index and the two data policy sub-indexes on cross-border data flows and domestic use 
of data) is multiplied by the two data-intensities for country c, from the list of data producing sectors d, 
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for each downstream manufacturing and services firm in sector j. As mentioned, one data intensity is 
the data use φjd as a ratio over labour called (D/L) taken in logs. The second one is the data use φjd 
expressed as a share of total intermediate input use called (D/IN). The formula we use for these 
respective intensities is:  
𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒 (D/L)𝑐𝑗𝑡 = ln
∑ 𝜑𝑗𝑑𝑑  
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗
∗ 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑡    (2) 
 
𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒 (D/IN)𝑐𝑗𝑡 =
∑ 𝜑𝑗𝑑𝑑
∑ 𝜑𝑗𝑖𝑖
∗  𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑡    (3) 
where φjd and φji come from the BEA’s input-output tables and are computed based on the value-added 
of inputs used. In equation (2), 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 comes from the US Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) for the year 
2007 and is reported at the 6-digit level NAICS but concorded into the 4-digit NACE. Then, the log is 
taken for this intensity. The data policy index refers to the three country-year specific regulatory indexes 
presented in Section 3. We choose our input-output coefficients to be industry-specific from these 
matrixes because Arnold et al. (2015) claim that input reliance coefficients measured at the firm level 
may suffer from endogeneity issues in connection with the performance of the firm.16 This approach is 
well-suited since ORBIS does not report any information on data input use. Moreover, as previously 
explained, since we use common input-output coefficients, φcjd, from the US (rather than a country-
sector specific one), our input-coefficients are even more exogenous. Of note, equation (2) and (3) are 
also used to assess the effect of data policies based on the two sub-indexes, that is the one on cross-
border data flows and the second one on domestic regulatory policies regarding the use of data.  
4.2 Baseline Specification 
We use equation (2) in our baseline regression presented in equation (4) which measures the extent to 
which firm-level TFP is affected by the data linkage variable in previous years. In other words, we 
regress the logarithm of our Ackerberg TFP measure of manufacturing and services firms i, in country 
c, in industry j, in time t, on the data linkage which is applied with a lag. As in the literature, the 
motivation for lagging the data linkage index is due to the time it takes before downstream firms across 
all countries face the regulatory consequences of restrictive data policies. In addition, taking the lag 
further reduces endogeneity concerns to the extent that reverse causality becomes less obvious. The 
baseline specification takes the following form:  
 
ln 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑗𝑡 = 𝛷 + 𝜃1DL𝑐𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜃2C𝑖𝑐𝑗𝑡  + 𝛿𝑐𝑡+ ϛ𝑗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑐𝑗𝑡   (4) 
In equation (4), the terms 𝛿𝑐𝑡 and ϛ𝑗𝑡 refer to the fixed effects by country-year and sector-year 
respectively. Sector fixed effects are set at the 4-digit NACE level. Instead of applying firm-fixed 
effects, which would be too strict in our panel setting, we include several firm-level controls (C𝑖𝑐𝑗𝑡). 
These control variables are taken from ORBIS and correct for the fact that larger firms usually have 
greater levels of productivity according to the firm-heterogeneity literature (see Bernard et al., 2003; 
Melitz, 2003). Therefore, we take the log of the number of employees in addition to the number of 
subsidiaries each firm has in order to account for the firm size. In addition, we also include the number 
of patents per employee each firm has obtained in order to correct for the fact that more innovative firms 
                                                     
16 This is different to Fernandes and Paunov (2012) who use firm-specific services inputs coefficients in the case of services. 
Although further endogeneity issues may be solved using input-output tables from the first year in our analysis, i.e. 2010, 
these were unfortunately not available. However, applying input coefficients from a previous year of our time period may 
also further resolve some potential reverse causality effects in that no endogeneity as a consequence of political economy 
considerations could exist. This may be the case when sectors with higher TFP levels and which are more dependent on 
data as inputs lobby for lower restrictions in their country. However, by taking coefficients from the US which is not in our 
sample and from the year 2007, some of these concerns are avoided. Other endogeneity issues are discussed below in the 
empirical specification.  
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tend to be more productive (see Griffith et al., 2004a; 2004b).17 We also include information on whether 
a firm has a foreign subsidiary or not (see below). Finally, 𝑖𝑐𝑗𝑡 is the residual. Regressions are estimated 
with standard errors which are two-way clustered by country-sector-year and firm over the years 2006-
2015.  
The fixed effects in equation (4) also control for various other policy influences and unobserved 
shocks. For example, previous works show that within industry tariff and input-tariff reductions should 
also be controlled for (see van der Marel, 2017) as manufacturing sectors are included in our dataset. 
However, given that tariffs within the EU are set at the Union level (although that’s not the case for the 
two non-EU countries in our dataset), they are in large part controlled for by the sector-year fixed effects. 
Moreover, in principle one can construct input tariffs by multiplying tariffs with sector-varying input 
coefficients. But this variable would nevertheless be dropped from our regressions. This is because 
tariffs are measured at the EU-level and therefore the analysis would only pick up the variation of the 
input coefficients and not of any country-sector variation stemming from the restrictiveness. For these 
reasons, we rely on the fixed effects to control for these policy influences.  
Furthermore, another control variable present in previous works is one that measures by year the 
foreign ownership share of firms. In our case, information on this variable is hard to find because ORBIS 
does not report such data. However, ORBIS does record whether a firm has a subsidiary in another 
country or not, which as mentioned above we include as part of the vector of firm-control variables. 
Taken together, most of our control variables are regrettably omitted in our specification.  
4.3 Baseline Extension 
In the next step, we expand our baseline specification to take into account any differential impact of data 
policies regulations on TFP of firms located in a country that is technologically well equipped. The 
prime reason for doing so is that digital sectors are likely to expand rapidly in countries with the enabling 
environment ready to transmit and employ electronic data. For instance, countries with qualitatively 
good telecom networks or with well-penetrated broadband subscriptions are likely to show not only 
greater levels of activities in data producing sectors, but also in see that downstream sectors reliant on 
data are affected by data policies in those countries with a better digital enabling environment. This is 
in line with the recent empirical services literature that has found that domestic institutions matter and 
can further explain differences in the impact of policies on downstream sectors (see for instance Iootty 
et al., 2016 and Beverelli et al., 2015). 
A well-suited proxy that captures how countries have developed a good digital environment is the 
WEF’s Network Readiness Indicator (NRI). This indicator measures the capacity of countries to 
leverage and exploit opportunities offered by ICT for increased competitiveness and well-being (WEF, 
2015). This country-specific index summarises various sub-indicators, such as the extent to which 
individuals are using the internet, international bandwidth in kb/s per user, the country’s availability of 
latest technologies, as well as the level of technology absorption by firms. All these sub-cases are 
relevant for our analysis and we therefore include this proxy in our extended regressions.  
In the augmented baseline specification, we interact our data linkage (DL𝑐𝑗𝑡−1) with a demeaned NRI 
variable varying by country and time. The augmented baseline specification for our cross-country setting 
therefore is: 
 
ln 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑗𝑡 = 𝛷 + 𝜃1DL𝑐𝑗𝑡−1+ 𝜃2DL𝑐𝑗𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑁𝑅𝐼𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃3C𝑖𝑐𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑐𝑡+ ϛ𝑗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑐𝑗𝑡  (5) 
Equation (5) and equation (4) apply a similar set of firm-level control variables with the same set of 
fixed effects.  
                                                     
17 Unfortunately, ORBIS does not provide any indication of the amount spent on R&D activities which prevents us from 
including such variables in our vector of firm-level control variables.  
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5. Results 
The results of our cross-country baseline estimations are presented in Tables 6 and 7. Column 1 in Table 
6 shows that the overall index of data policies is significantly strong with a negative sign. This indicates 
that countries with a stricter overall framework regarding the use and transfer of data exhibit a significant 
negative impact on the productivity of firms in those sectors that rely more heavily on data in their 
production process. Columns 2 and 3 report the coefficient results when breaking up our full index into 
the two sub-components of cross-border policies and domestic regulatory policies. The results also show 
that in these two cases, the coefficients are negatively significant at the 1 percent level. Hence, both 
types of policies have a significant knock-on effect on downstream users of data. Column 4 presents the 
results when entering the two types of policies together. Both coefficient results are negative and 
significant.  
Table 7 shows the results using alternative TFP measures, which have been outlined in the previous 
section. The table displays the results for the two different types of data policies when entered together. 
Column 1 replicates the results using our preferred Ackerberg TFP by means of comparison. Column 2 
shows the results for the TFP by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and confirms the significance of both sub-
indexes of data policies. On the other hand, the TFP specification from Olley and Pakes (1996) shows 
no significance for the cross-border category of data policies, but nonetheless, the outcome remains 
strongly significant for the domestic regulatory data policies.  
The next two TFP specifications by Hsieh and Klenow (2009; 2014) distinguish between the 
revenue-based (TFPR) and physical (TFPQ) productivity. These results show that it is only in case of 
the TFPQ specification that both variables come out as negative and significant. Finally, we have also 
computed simple labour productivity and used it in the regressions. The results for this proxy show that 
only domestic regulatory policies come out as significant.  
Regarding the extended regressions, Table 8 reports the differential effects of countries having a 
strong network system that is interacted with our data linkage variable. Again, column 1 of this table 
shows that the full data policy index has a significant and negative impact at the 1 percent level. In 
addition, the differential effect is also significant although the coefficient size is relatively small. Yet, it 
confirms our prior assumption that restrictive data policies have a supplementary adverse effect in 
countries with a good network environment. In other words, restrictive data regulations in combination 
with strong network readiness in countries are strong predictors for explaining the performance of TFP 
of firms in downstream industries that are reliant on data as inputs. This significant result holds for 
cross-border data policies as illustrated by the relatively high coefficient results in column 2. Yet, no 
significant effect is found for the interaction term with the data policy index of the domestic use of data 
in column 3. In addition, column 4 shows that, when all categories are entered together, the coefficient 
for the latter interaction term is actually positive. This would mean that firms’ productivity in more 
digital-enabled countries is less affected by strict data policies on domestic use of data.  
An additional extension from our baseline specification is an interaction with a firm-level variable. 
The ORBIS database shows which manufacturing firms have a services affiliate, as shown in Miroudot 
and Cadestin (2017). This allows us to assess whether data policies disproportionately hurt so-called 
servicified firms as opposed to the general effect across all firms in our sample.  
To measure this, we create a dummy variable assigning a score of 1 when a manufacturing firm has 
a service affiliate and zero otherwise. Table 9 shows the results. For the overall data policy index, no 
significant differential results are found for servicified firms. However, a positive and significant result 
is found in the interaction term for cross-border data policies. This indicates that cross-border data 
policies have a less than significant impact on servicified firms. Yet, since the baseline coefficient is 
significant, but the interaction coefficient size is smaller, it nonetheless suggests that there is significant 
(negative) differential effect on servicified firms. The results also show that, for domestic policies, no 
additional effect is found when entered separately. However, when entered together with cross-border 
policies there is a negative significant result.  
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5.1 Robustness checks 
In this section, we provide several robustness checks for our analysis. In particular, the robustness checks 
should address concerns on the omission of any regulatory variables in services, on the use of an 
outdated input-reliance coefficient, and on the fact that the many observations from firm-level data 
might drive our results. We deal with these concerns below.  
5.1.1 Services linkage variable 
This robustness check mostly tackles the fact that many services are heavily regulated, and that in turn 
many services are used also as inputs. This fact may cause concerns that if in the regressions this 
information is omitted, the results would fail to include a channel of services regulations that may be 
the prime channel to explain TFP variations in our data. For that reason, we add a services linkage 
variable that is comprised of a similar interaction term as before: regulatory policies in services sectors 
are interacted with each downstream sector’s use of services inputs. This follows previous papers on 
this topic that have established this services linkage variable such as Arnold et al. (2011; 2015). Our 
services linkage takes the following form:  
 
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒 (S/L)𝑐𝑗𝑡 = ln
∑ 𝜑𝑗𝑑𝑑  
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗
∗ 𝑁𝑀𝑅 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑑𝑡   (6) 
 
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒 (S/IN)𝑐𝑗𝑡 =
∑ 𝜑𝑗𝑑𝑑
∑ 𝜑𝑗𝑖𝑖
∗  𝑁𝑀𝑅 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑑𝑡   (7) 
where φjd and φji come again from the BEA’s input-output tables for the year 2007 reported at the 6-digit 
level but concorded into the 4-digit NACE. In addition, 𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑗 comes from the BLS also for the year 
2007.  
The services policy index refers to the country-sector-year specific regulatory indexes in services 
from the OECD PMR database and consist of the Non-Manufacturing Regulation (NMR) index for six 
specific sectors, namely: professional services, transportation, utilities, post, retail and telecom services. 
Their separate interaction results are aggregated into an overall index of services linkages as equation 
(6) outlines.  
The results of including our services linkage control variable are shown in Table 10. First, the 
services linkage variable comes out very significant in all entries from column 1 – 4. This confirms 
previous findings in the literature that sectors whose inputs are more services-intense are more affected 
by regulatory policy changes in services. All data-linkage variables remain robust and significant but 
have a somewhat lower coefficient size than found in Table 6. The coefficient results on the data linkage 
variables are much larger than the ones found for the services linkage variables. Yet one should keep in 
mind that they cannot be directly compared because they are interacted with different policy and 
intensity values. Also, we have used ln(S/L) as part of the interaction linkage term while previous papers 
have employed the simple share of services inputs as part of total input use, i.e. (S/IN), and therefore 
show greater coefficient sizes.  
We also regress our baseline equation with the services linkage variable using the share of services 
inputs in total inputs, (S/IN), as input coefficients in the interaction term. In order to be consistent, we 
must also use this input share for the data linkage variable. This means that we use the share of data as 
inputs in total inputs use as well, i.e. (D/IN). Note that in both cases no logs are taken for this share 
following standard practice in the previous literature. The results are shown in Table 11. In this table, 
the services linkage variables all come out statistically significant with a negative coefficient sign. All 
coefficient sizes are much larger than when using the ratio over labour as input coefficients, as expected 
and in line with previous papers. Regarding the data policy variable, the overall policy index variable 
and domestic regulatory index variable come out statistically significant as shown in columns 1 and 3 
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respectively. The cross-border index variable is only weakly significant and falls short of any 
significance in column 4 when entering the two indexes together.  
5.1.2 Alternative data-intensities 
Our second robustness check takes care of the fact that our data-intensity variable may be outdated. Our 
current data-intensity variables (D/L) and (D/IN) are based on the BEA’s Input Use tables from 2007. 
Although this gives us an exogenous identification strategy as previously explained, it may run the risk 
that this data-reliance measure does not capture well the extent to which sectors have undergone 
extensive increases of data-use over recent years. Therefore, we employ an alternative proxy for data-
use from the 2011 US Census Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Survey, which we 
call Dsoft. These data are survey-based and record at detailed NAICS sector-level how much each 
industry and service sector spend on ICT in terms of ICT equipment and computer software in million 
USD.  
For our regressions, we take the data on computer software expenditure. The US Census ICT Survey 
records two separate variables regarding software expenditure, namely non-capitalised and capitalised. 
We take non-capitalised expenditure in our baseline regression, but similar results appear when using 
the capitalised software expenditure. Non-capitalised computer software expenditure is comprised of 
purchases and payroll for developing software and software licensing and service/maintenance 
agreements for software. Even though this proxy does not entirely capture the extent to which sectors 
use electronic data, it is nonetheless the nearest alternative variable for data usage we can publicly find. 
We take the year 2010 for our regressions and divide this software expenditure over labour as we have 
done in our baseline regression, also for the year 2010. The year 2010 lies somewhere in the middle of 
our panel analysis. Table B12 in Annex B replicates the Top 10 most and least data-intense sectors with 
this new intensity proxy.  
The results are shown in Table 12. In all cases, our updated data-intensity variables retain their 
significance as the coefficients are very robust. Interestingly, the coefficient size in column 1 is almost 
equal to the one reported in column 1 of Table 6. This is also the case for the coefficient result in column 
3 for the domestic regulatory restrictions on data. Yet, the coefficient size for the index on cross-border 
data flows restrictions more than doubles compared to the result in Table 6 and retains its high 
coefficient size when entered together with the policy index on the domestic use of data in column 4. 
This outcome may mean that data policies have a particularly high impact on software-intense sectors.  
5.1.3 Sector-level Productivity Measures 
A final potential concern is related to the fact that the high number of observations from firm-level data 
drives our significant results. Although this should not be of immediate concern as we apply the most 
stringent clustering effect, it may nonetheless be of interest to use sector-level TFP measures to see 
whether these results can corroborate our main findings of the baseline regression. There are two ways 
of using aggregated productivity measures. One is by aggregating our firm-level TFP measures and 
regressing the baseline specification; the second is using alternative cross-country level TFP measures 
at the sector-level. Given that the first option may suffer from aggregation problems due to the sample 
selection, we opt for the second one and we choose a widely accepted database that has established 
various credible productivity measures in recent years, namely the EU KLEMS.  
The EU KLEMS database provides six different TFP and labour productivity (LP) measures that can 
be used in our regressions, namely (i) TFP value added based growth (TFPva_i); (ii) TFP value added 
per hour worked based growth (TFPlp1_i); (iii) TFP value added per person employed based growth 
(TFPlp2_i); (iv) gross value added per hour worked, which is labour productivity (LP_i); (v) growth 
rate of value added per hour worked (LP1_q); and finally (vi) growth rate of value added per person 
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employed (LP2_q). We use all of them in our regression and replicate the baseline specification 
presented in Table 7.  
Unfortunately, the two non-European countries which we use in the firm-level analysis are left out 
(i.e. South Korea and Japan), but the US is included as it is available in EU KLEMS. We use a similar 
time period for our regressions as used with our firm-level data, i.e. 2006-2015. For this specification, 
we use the updated data-intensity, Dsoft, based on non-capitalised software expenditure over labour first. 
We also run again the regressions for the capitalised software expenditures over labour.18  
The results in Table 13 (when using non-capitalised software expenditures over labour) show that 
the policy restrictions related to cross-border flows of data have a negative coefficient outcome in all 
cases when using the three different TFP measures but remain insignificant. For the other three labour 
productivity variables, the coefficient results are positive but also insignificant. The results on 
restrictions related to domestic regulatory barriers on data show significant negative coefficient 
outcomes. This is particularly true when using LP_i in column 4 whereas for the two TFP measures in 
columns 1 and 2 the results are weakly significant. This latter result changes slightly, however, when 
using capitalised software expenditures over labour as data-intensities as shown in Table 14. In this 
table, domestic regulatory date policies show somewhat stronger significant results for the two TFP 
measures in columns 1 and 2. 
6. Conclusions 
For many firms, the increased use of data has become an essential feature of their production processes 
in the digital era. Firms rely on electronic data and the internet to improve their overall economic 
performance which we define as productivity in this paper. At the same time, many governments have 
started to regulate the use and transfer of data over the internet. This paper finds that regulatory policies 
on data inhibit the productivity performance of firms in data-intense sectors.  
The regulatory policies that target data have so far received limited attention in empirical economic 
studies. In this sense, this paper constitutes a useful contribution by testing whether data regulations 
have any bearing on the productivity performance of firms. We employ a panel analysis of policy 
approaches on the cross-border transfer and domestic use of data for a group of developed economies 
to make a new contribution in the literature on the productivity performance of firms. In particular, we 
investigate how the productivity of data-intense firms in downstream sectors is affected by stricter data 
policies. These regulatory policies on data target both the domestic use of data within a country as well 
as the cross-border flows of data across countries.  
The results of our analysis show strong significant evidence that a stricter policy regime on the use 
and cross-border transfer of data has a negative impact on firms’ economic performance in sectors that 
rely more on data in their production process. Besides this negative impact, the coefficient size is 
relatively large meaning the economic impact is substantial. We show that both data policies on the 
domestic use and cross-border movement of data have a significant effect on productivity. Yet, the 
results also show that the negative effect is somewhat more robust for the restrictions that apply on the 
domestic use of use than those policies that restrict the movement of data across borders. This is 
particularly true when controlling for the additional variables of regulations that may affect productivity, 
for different proxies for data intensities and when using sector-level productivity data.  
Our results suggest that data policies deserve closer attention by policymakers. The economic impact 
of these measures on local business should be carefully weighed against the policy objective pursued by 
the government such as privacy or security in order to strike the right balance of what is legitimate 
                                                     
18 We also ran regressions using our original data-intensities computed with BEA IO data for the year 2007 with labour from 
BLS for similar year following equation (2) but without any significant results.  
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regulation without excessively increasing in costs for firms and, eventually, also for consumers. Future 
research should focus on which measures can better address the concerns of governments related to their 
non-economic objectives without creating unnecessary costs on firms, that inevitably translate in costs 
for their own economy. It will be especially important to advance research focussed on developing 
countries as these countries are imposing today (or planning to impose) the highest level of restrictions 
on cross-border data flows. While often these measures are driven by industrial policy objectives, this 
paper shows that strict data policies are more likely to hurt the economy in the long-run than supporting 
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Tables and Figures 
Figure 1: Global data traffic 
 
Source: Cisco (Visual Networking Index); IP stands for Internet Protocol, BP 
stands for petabyte which is a multiple of the unit byte for digital information, 
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Table 1: Categories of the data policy index and weights 
Categories Type of measures Weighting 
1. Cross-border data flow measures 0.5 
 1.1 Ban to transfer or local processing requirement 0.5 
 1.2 Local storage requirement 0.25 
 1.3 Conditional flow regime 0.25 
 2. Domestic regulatory measures 0.5 
2.1 Data retention 0.15 
 2.1.1 Minimum period 0.7 
 2.1.2 Maximum period 0.3 
2.2 Subject rights on data privacy 0.10 
 2.2.1 Burdensome consent requirement 0.5 
 2.2.2 Right to be forgotten 0.5 
2.3 Administrative requirements on data privacy 0.15 
 2.3.1 Data protection impact assessment (DPIA) 0.3 
 2.3.2 Data protection officer (DPO) 0.3 
 2.3.3 Data breach notification 0.1 
 2.3.4 Government access to personal data 0.3 
2.4 Sanctions for non-compliance 0.05 
 2.4.1 Monetary fine above 250.000 EUR or set as a percentage of revenue 0.5 
 2.4.2 Jail time 0.5 
2.5 Other restrictive practices related to data policies 0.05 
 2.5.1 Other restrictive practices related to data policies 1 
Source: Ferracane et al. (2018b) 
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Figure 2: Data policy index over time, all countries (2006-2016) 
 
Source: ECIPE; the line for Data Policies covers both Cross-border (CB) and Domestic (DOM) regulatory 
policies, which is therefore composed of the two items. All three indexes are a weighted average across the 30 















2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Data policies Cross-border Domestic
Martina Francesca Ferracane, Janez Kren and Erik van der Marel 
22 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
Table 2: Data policy index by country (2017) 





Austria 0.335 0.125 0.210 
Belgium 0.323 0.188 0.135 
Bulgaria 0.360 0.250 0.110 
Croatia 0.280 0.125 0.155 
Cyprus 0.340 0.125 0.215 
Czech Republic 0.235 0.125 0.110 
Denmark 0.515 0.250 0.265 
Estonia 0.340 0.125 0.215 
Finland 0.453 0.188 0.265 
France 0.710 0.375 0.335 
Germany 0.635 0.250 0.385 
Greece 0.403 0.188 0.215 
Hungary 0.385 0.125 0.260 
Ireland 0.340 0.125 0.215 
Italy 0.428 0.188 0.240 
Japan 0.235 0.125 0.110 
Korea 0.595 0.250 0.345 
Latvia 0.340 0.125 0.215 
Lithuania 0.340 0.125 0.215 
Luxembourg 0.340 0.125 0.215 
Malta 0.390 0.125 0.265 
Netherlands 0.323 0.188 0.135 
Poland 0.490 0.250 0.240 
Portugal 0.340 0.125 0.215 
Romania 0.323 0.188 0.135 
Slovakia 0.235 0.125 0.110 
Slovenia 0.285 0.125 0.160 
Spain 0.410 0.125 0.285 
Sweden 0.403 0.188 0.215 
UK 0.428 0.188 0.240 
    
STD 0.112 0.061 0.071 
Min 0.235 0.125 0.110 
Max 0.710 0.375 0.385 
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511200 Software publishers 
517110 Wired telecommunications carriers 
517210 Wireless telecommunications carriers (except satellite) 
518200 Data processing, hosting, and related services 
519130 Internet publishing and broadcasting and Web search portals 
541511 Custom computer programming services 
541512 Computer systems design services 
541513 Other computer related services, including facilities management 
Source: BEA 2007 IO Use Table. 
 
Table 4: Top 10 sectors with highest and lowest data use over labour ratio, ln(D/L) 
NACE 
Rev. 2 
Sector description ln(D/L) 
Highest 
47 Retail trade 5.90 
61 Telecommunications 3.90 
58 Publishing activities 3.19 
63 Information services activities 3.07 
68 Real estate 2.75 
66 Activities auxiliary to finance and insurance services 2.60 
70 Activities of head offices, management consultancy 2.23 
60 Programming and broadcasting activities 2.06 
74 Other professional, scientific and technical services 2.04 
23 Other non-metallic mineral products 1.99 
Lowest 
53 Postal and courier services -0.14 
55 Accommodation -0.14 
14 Wearing apparel -0.33 
43 Specialized construction activities -0.49 
41 Construction of buildings -0.51 
42 Civil engineering -0.51 
15 Leather and related products -0.59 
11 Beverages -0.83 
56 Food and beverages services -0.94 
12 Tobacco products -2.05 
Source: Authors’ calculations using BEA 2007 IO Use Table and BLS.  
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Table 5: Top 10 sectors with highest and lowest data shares, (D/IN) 
NACE 
Rev. 2 
Sector description (D/IN) 
Highest 
61 Telecommunications 0.236 
63 Information services activities 0.141 
58 Publishing activities 0.140 
80 Security and investigation activities 0.124 
79 Travel agency, tour operator reservation activities 0.120 
82 Office administrative, office support, other business 0.107 
69 Legal and accounting activities 0.095 
62 Computer programming, consultancy and related 0.093 
78 Employment activities 0.091 
66 Activities auxiliary to finance and insurance services 0.087 
Lowest 
43 Specialized construction 0.009 
42 Civil engineering 0.008 
41 Construction of buildings 0.008 
24 Basic metals 0.008 
20 Chemicals and chemical products 0.007 
29 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.007 
11 Beverages 0.007 
10 Food products 0.005 
12 Tobacco products 0.005 
19 Coke and refined petroleum 0.004 
Source: Authors’ calculations using BEA 2007 IO Use Table. 
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Figure 3: TFP and data use over labour ratio (D/L) for goods and services, (2013-2015) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using BEA 2007 IO Use Table and BLS. This figure omits 2-digit NACE Rev. 2 
sector 12 and 47 for being extreme outliers. TFP calculated following Ackerberg et al. (2015) and averaged over 
2012-2015. (D/L) is put in logs. In the graph, markers in blue represent manufacturing industries and markers in 
brown represent services sectors (except accommodation).  
Figure 4: TFP and data use over labour ratio (D/L) for services only, (2013-2015) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using BEA 2007 IO Use Table and BLS. This figure omits 2-digit NACE Rev. 2 
sector 12 and 47 for being extreme outliers. TFP calculated following Ackerberg et al. (2015) and averaged over 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using BEA 2007 IO Use Table. This figure omits 2-digit NACE Rev. 2 sector 12 
for being an extreme outlier. TFP calculated following Ackerberg et al. (2015) and averaged over 2012-2015. 
(D/IN) is put in logs. In the graph, markers in blue represent manufacturing industries and markers in brown 
represent services sectors (except accommodation). 




Source: Authors’ calculations using BEA 2007 IO Use Table. This figure omits 2-digit NACE Rev. 2 sector 12 
for being an extreme outlier. Labour productivity is the logs of value-added over labour and averaged over 2012-
2015. (D/IN) and (D/L) are put in logs. In the graph, markers in blue represent manufacturing industries and 
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Table 6: Baseline regression results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  TFP TFP TFP TFP 
     
ln(D/L) * Data policy -0.334***    
 (0.000)    
ln(D/L) * Data policy CB  -0.257***  -0.305*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ln(D/L) * Data policy DOM   -0.330*** -0.340*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
     
FE Country-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE Sector-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 3516012 3516012 3516012 3516012 
R2A 0.866 0.865 0.866 0.866 
R2W 0.023 0.015 0.022 0.023 
RMSE 0.444 0.445 0.444 0.444 
Note: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is in logs and 
follows Ackerberg et al. (2015). Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the 
country-industry-year and firm level. Fixed effects for sector is applied at NACE 
Rev. 2 4-digit level. CB denotes Cross-Border and covers all policies outlined under 
1.1 in Annex A. DOM denotes Domestic and covers all policies outlined under 1.2 
in Annex A.   
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Table 7: Baseline regression results with alternative TFP measures and labour productivity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  ACF L&P O&P TFPR TFPQ LabPr 
       









 (0.000) (0.000) (0.270) (0.115) (0.000) (0.262) 













 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.158) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
FE Country-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE Sector-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       




R2A 0.866 0.702 0.615 0.131 0.322 0.569 
R2W 0.023 0.191 0.008 0.010 0.242 0.022 
RMSE 0.444 0.702 1.017 0.776 1.014 0.670 
Note: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The dependent variable represents different productivity measures, 
namely Ackerberg et al. (2015) for ACF; Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) for L&P; Olley and Pakes (1996) for 
O&P; Hsieh and Klenow (2009; 2014) for TFPR and TFPQ; and value-added per employee for LabPr. All 
productivity measures are put in logs. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the country-industry-year 
and firm level. Fixed effects for sector is applied at NACE Rev. 2 4-digit level. CB denotes Cross-Border and 
covers all policies outlined under 1.1 in Annex A. DOM denotes Domestic and covers all policies outlined 
under 1.2 in Annex A. 
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Table 8: Extended baseline regression results with the NRI interaction term 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  TFP TFP TFP TFP 
     
ln(D/L) * Data policy -0.316***    
 (0.000)    
ln(D/L) * Data policy * NRI -0.022**    
 (0.023)    
ln(D/L) * Data policy CB  -0.177**  -0.052 
  (0.010)  (0.429) 
ln(D/L) * Data policy CB * NRI  -0.124***  -0.372*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ln(D/L) * Data policy DOM   -0.328*** -0.410*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(D/L) * Data policy DOM * NRI   -0.005 0.374*** 
   (0.843) (0.000) 
     
FE Country-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE Sector-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 3516012 3516012 3516012 3516012 
R2A 0.866 0.865 0.866 0.867 
R2W 0.023 0.017 0.022 0.027 
RMSE 0.444 0.445 0.444 0.443 
Note: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is in logs and follows 
Ackerberg et al. (2015). Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the country-industry-
year and firm level. Fixed effects for sector is applied at NACE Rev. 2 4-digit level. CB 
denotes Cross-Border and covers all policies outlined under 1.1 in Annex A. DOM denotes 
Domestic and covers all policies outlined under 1.2 in Annex A. The variable NRI denotes 
the Network Readiness Indicator from the WEF and is country-specific and is demeaned.  
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Table 9: Extended baseline regression results with servicification dummy (S) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  TFP TFP TFP TFP 
     
ln(D/L) * Data policy -0.335***    
 (0.000)    
ln(D/L) * Data policy * S -0.017    
 (0.395)    
ln(D/L) * Data policy CB  -0.253***  -0.306*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ln(D/L) * Data policy CB * S  0.194***  0.139*** 
  (0.000)  (0.002) 
ln(D/L) * Data policy DOM   -0.331*** -0.340*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(D/L) * Data policy DOM * S   -0.027 -0.198*** 
   (0.363) (0.000) 
Servicified firms (S) 0.032*** -0.001 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 (0.000) (0.846) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
FE Country-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE Sector-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 3516012 3516012 3516012 3516012 
R2A 0.866 0.865 0.866 0.866 
R2W 0.023 0.015 0.022 0.024 
RMSE 0.444 0.445 0.444 0.444 
Note: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is in logs and follows 
Ackerberg et al. (2015). Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the country-
industry-year and firm level. Fixed effects for sector is applied at NACE Rev. 2 4-digit 
level. CB denotes Cross-Border and covers all policies outlined under 1.1 in Annex A. 
DOM denotes Domestic and covers all policies outlined under 1.2 in Annex A. The 
variable S represents a dummy variable when a manufacturing firm has a services 
affiliate and is firm-specific.  
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Table 10: Baseline regression results with services linkage control variable 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  TFP TFP TFP TFP 
     
ln(D/L) * Data policy -0.288***    
 (0.000)    
ln(D/L) * Data policy CB  -0.190**  -0.264*** 
  (0.015)  (0.001) 
ln(D/L) * Data policy DOM   -0.277*** -0.292*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(S/L) * NMR services -0.005** -0.010*** -0.006*** -0.005** 
 (0.020) (0.000) (0.004) (0.025) 
     
FE Country-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE Sector-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 2391308 2391308 2391308 2391308 
R2A 0.865 0.864 0.865 0.865 
R2W 0.022 0.017 0.022 0.023 
RMSE 0.444 0.445 0.444 0.444 
Note: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is in logs and 
follows Ackerberg et al. (2015). Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the 
country-industry-year and firm level. Fixed effects for sector is applied at NACE 
Rev. 2 4-digit level. CB denotes Cross-Border and covers all policies outlined under 
1.1 in Annex A. DOM denotes Domestic and covers all policies outlined under 1.2 
in Annex A. NMR denotes the Non-Manufacturing Regulations policies in services 
sectors from the OECD’s PMR and is sector-specific but aggregated to country-
level.  
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Table 11: Baseline regression results with services linkage control variable interacted with share 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  TFP TFP TFP TFP 
     
(D/IN) * Data policy -13.711***    
 (0.000)    
(D/IN) * Data policy CB  -4.323*  -0.908 
  (0.065)  (0.679) 
(D/IN) * Data policy DOM   -18.846*** -18.787*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
(S/IN) * NMR services -1.388*** -1.683*** -1.278*** -1.280*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
FE Country-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE Sector-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 2437411 2437411 2437411 2437411 
R2A 0.865 0.865 0.866 0.866 
R2W 0.020 0.016 0.021 0.021 
RMSE 0.443 0.444 0.442 0.442 
Note: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is in logs and follows 
Ackerberg et al. (2015). Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the country-
industry-year and firm level. Fixed effects for sector is applied at NACE Rev. 2 4-digit 
level. (D/IN) denotes the share of data input use in total input use by sector (IN) whereas 
(S/IN) denotes the share of services input use in total input use by sector. CB denotes 
Cross-Border and covers all policies outlined under 1.1 in Annex A. DOM denotes 
Domestic and covers all policies outlined under 1.2 in Annex A. NMR denotes the Non-
Manufacturing Regulations policies in services sectors from the OECD’s PMR and is 
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Table 12: Baseline regression results with alternative data-intensities 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  TFP TFP TFP TFP 
     
ln(Dsoft/L) * Data policy -0.392***    
 (0.000)    
ln(Dsoft/L) * Data policy CB  -0.619***  -0.649*** 
 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
ln(Dsoft/L) * Data policy DOM   -0.316*** -0.331*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
     
FE Country-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE Sector-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 3515879 3515879 3515879 3515879 
R2A 0.867 0.866 0.866 0.867 
R2W 0.028 0.022 0.022 0.030 
RMSE 0.443 0.444 0.444 0.442 
Note: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is in logs and follows 
Ackerberg et al. (2015). Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the country-
industry-year and firm level. (Dsoft/L) denotes the ratio of total non-capitalised 
computer software expenditures over labour by NACE Rev. 2 4-digit sector level, 
both taken from the US Census for the year 2010. Fixed effects for sector is applied 
at NACE Rev. 2 4-digit level. CB denotes Cross-Border and covers all policies 
outlined under 1.1 in Annex A. DOM denotes Domestic and covers all policies 
outlined under 1.2 in Annex A.  
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Table 13: Baseline regression results with sector-level productivity measures from EU KLEMS (1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  TFPva_i TFPlp1_i TFPlp2_i LP_i LP1_q LP2_q 
       
ln(Dsoft/L) * Data policy CB -0.011 -0.018 -0.019 0.001 0.349 0.097 
 (0.440) (0.336) (0.326) (0.952) (0.293) (0.769) 
ln(Dsoft/L) * Data policy DOM -0.035* -0.032* -0.025 -0.058*** -0.293 -0.199 
 (0.065) (0.096) (0.201) (0.004) (0.316) (0.454) 
       
FE country-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE sector-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 3506 3416 3416 6669 3564 3747 
R2A 0.170 0.171 0.188 0.105 0.257 0.256 
R2W 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
RMSE 0.095 0.096 0.098 0.151 1.107 1.105 
Note: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The dependent variable represents different productivity measures from 
EU KLEMs, namely is TFPva_i is TFP value added based growth; TFPlp1_i is TFP value added per hour worked 
based growth; TFPlp2_i is TFP value added per person employed based growth; LP_i is gross value added per 
hour worked; LP1_q is growth rate of value added per hour worked; and LP2_q is growth rate of value added per 
person employed. All productivity measures are put in logs. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-
industry-year level. (Dsoft/L) denotes the ratio of total non-capitalised computer software expenditures over labour 
by NACE Rev. 2 2-digit sector level, both taken from the US Census. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
country-industry-year level. Fixed effects for sector is applied at NACE Rev. 2 2-digit level. CB denotes Cross-
Border and covers all policies outlined under 1.1 in Annex A. DOM denotes Domestic and covers all policies 
outlined under 1.2 in Annex A. 
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Table 14: Baseline regression results with sector-level productivity measures from EU KLEMS (2) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  TFPva_i TFPlp1_i TFPlp2_i LP_i LP1_q LP2_q 
       
ln(Dsoft/L) * Data policy CB -0.002 -0.010 -0.013 0.013 0.300 0.162 
 (0.856) (0.487) (0.383) (0.378) (0.281) (0.553) 
ln(Dsoft/L) * Data policy DOM -0.035** -0.032** -0.026* -0.053*** -0.165 -0.131 
 (0.018) (0.035) (0.092) (0.001) (0.498) (0.552) 
       
FE country-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE sector-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 3506 3416 3416 6669 3564 3747 
R2A 0.170 0.171 0.188 0.105 0.257 0.256 
R2W 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
RMSE 0.095 0.096 0.098 0.151 1.107 1.105 
Note: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The dependent variable represents different productivity measures from 
EU KLEMs, namely is TFPva_i is TFP value added based growth; TFPlp1_i is TFP value added per hour worked 
based growth; TFPlp2_i is TFP value added per person employed based growth; LP_i is gross value added per 
hour worked; LP1_q is growth rate of value added per hour worked; and LP2_q is growth rate of value added per 
person employed. All productivity measures are put in logs. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-
industry-year level. (Dsoft/L) denotes the ratio of total capitalised computer software expenditures over labour by 
NACE Rev. 2 2-digit sector level, both taken from the US Census. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-
industry-year level. Fixed effects for sector is applied at NACE Rev. 2 2-digit level. CB denotes Cross-Border and 
covers all policies outlined under 1.1 in Annex A. DOM denotes Domestic and covers all policies outlined under 
1.2 in Annex A. 
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Annex A: Methodology for the data policy index 
The data policy index covers those data policies considered to impose a restriction on the cross-border 
movement and the domestic use of data. The methodology to build the index follows Ferracane et al. 
(2018b) and covers the measures listed in the Digital Trade Estimates (DTE) database which is available 
on the ECIPE website (www.ecipe.org/dte/database). Starting from the DTE database, these policies are 
aggregated into an index using a detailed weighting scheme adapted from Ferracane et al. (2018b). We 
expand the index released by Ferracane et al. (2018b), which covered only the years 2016/2017, to create 
a panel for the years 2006-2016 that we can use in our regressions. In addition, the database and index 
are updated with new regulatory measures found in certain countries. 
While certain policies on data flows can be legitimate and necessary to protect the privacy of the 
individual or to ensure national security, these policies nevertheless create a cost for trade and are 
therefore included in the analysis. The criteria for listing a certain policy measure in the DTE database 
are the following: (i) it creates a more restrictive regime for online versus offline users of data; (ii) it 
implies a different treatment between domestic and foreign users of data; and (iii) it is applied in a 
manner considered disproportionately burdensome to achieve a certain policy objective.  
Each policy measure identified in any of the categories receives a score that varies between 0 
(completely open) and 1 (virtually closed) according to how vast its scope is. A higher score represents 
a higher level of restrictiveness in data policies. The data policy index also varies between 0 (completely 
open) and 1 (virtually closed). The higher the index, the stricter the data policies implemented in the 
countries.  
The index is composed of two sub-indexes that cover two main types of policy measures that we 
analyse in this paper: one sub-index covers policies on the cross-border movement of data and one sub-
index covers policies on the domestic use of data. Analysing these two sub-indexes separately provides 
additional information on whether the impact of data policies on services trade varies according to the 
nature of the policies. The full data policy index is measured as the sum of these two sub-indexes. This 
annex presents in detail how the two sub-indexes are composed. It shows which policy measures are 
contained in each of the sub-index and the scheme applied to weigh and score each measure. 
The list of measures included in the two sub-indexes is summarised in Table 1. As shown in the table, 
the sub-indexes are measures as a weighted average of different types of measures. The weights are 
intended to reflect the level of restrictiveness of the types of measures in terms of costs for digital trade. 
The first sub-index on cross-border data flows covers three types of measures, namely (i) a ban to 
transfer data or a local processing requirement for data; (ii) a local storage requirement, and (iii) a 
conditional flow regime. The second sub-index covers a series of subcategories of policies affecting the 
domestic use of data. These are: (i) data retention requirements, (ii) subject rights on data privacy, (iii) 
administrative requirements on data privacy, (iv) sanctions for non-compliance, and finally, (v) other 
restrictive practices related to data policies.  
The main sources used to create the database are national data protection legislations. Otherwise, 
information is obtained from legal analyses on data policies and regulations from high profile law firms 
and from OECD (2015). Moreover, occasionally corporate blogs and business reports were also taken 
into consideration, as they can provide useful information on the de facto regime faced by the company 
when it comes to movement of data.  
1.1 Sub-index on cross-border data flows 
The first sub-index covers those policy measures restricting cross-border data flows. These measures 
are also referred to as “data localisation” measures and can be defined as government imposed measures 
which result in the localisation of data within a certain jurisdiction. Measures related to data localisation 
come in various forms and have different degrees of restrictiveness depending on the type of measure 
itself, but also on the sector and type of data affected.  
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We identify three types of measures, namely (i) a ban to transfer data or a local processing 
requirement for data; (ii) a local storage requirement, and (iii) a conditional flow regime. As shown in 
table 3, the category of bans to transfer and local processing requirements has a score of 0.5, while the 
other two categories have a score of 0.25 each. The sum of the scores of these categories can go up to 
1, that reflects a situation of virtually closed regime on cross-border data flows. This score is multiplied 
by 0.5 to create the final sub-index on cross-border data flows. The sub-index therefore goes from 0 
(completely open) to 0.5 (virtually closed). 
Bans to transfer data across the border and local processing requirements are the most restrictive 
measures on cross-border flow of data. In case of a ban to transfer data or a local processing requirement, 
the company needs to either build data centres within the implementing jurisdiction or switch to local 
service providers with a consequent increase in costs if these domestic service providers are less efficient 
than foreign providers. The difference between bans to transfer and local processing requirements is 
quite subtle. In the first case, the company is not allowed to even send a copy of the data cross-border. 
In the second case, the company can still send a copy of the data abroad - which can be important for 
communication between subsidiary and its parent company and in general for exchange of information 
within the company. In both cases, however, the main data processing activities need to be done in the 
implementing jurisdiction.  
For the scoring of these measures, both the sectoral coverage of the measure as well as the type of 
data affected are taken into account. If the ban to transfer or local processing requirement applies to a 
specific subset of data (for instance, when it applies to health records or accounting data only), this 
measure receives a scoring of 0.5. A similar score is also assigned when the restriction only applies to 
specific countries (for instance, when data cannot be sent for processing only to a specific country). On 
the other hand, when the measure applies to all personal data or data of an entire sector (such as financial 
services or telecommunication sector), then a score of 1 is given. Measures targeting personal data also 
receive the highest score because it is often hard to disentangle personal information versus non-personal 
information, and therefore measures targeting personal data often end up covering the vast majority of 
data in the economy (MIT, 2015). The score, as always, goes from 0 (completely open) to 1 (virtually 
closed). Therefore, if there are two measures scoring 0.5, the score is 1. If there are more additional 
measures, the score for this category still remains one. This score is then weighted by 0.5 which is the 
weight assigned to the category of bans and local processing requirements (as presented in Table 1). 
The second category covers local storage requirements. These measures require a company to keep 
a copy of certain data within the country. Local storage requirements often apply to specific data such 
as accounting or bookkeeping data. As long as the copy of the data remains within the national territory, 
the company can operate as usual. As for the scoring, when data storage is only for specific data as 
defined above, this measure receives a score of 0.5, whereas when the data storage applies to personal 
data or to an entire sector, it receives a score of 1. As mentioned before, the score goes up to 1 maximum 
and is then weighted by 0.25 which is the weight assigned to the category of local storage requirements 
(as presented in Table 1). 
The third category of cost-enhancing measures related to cross-border flow of data is the case of 
conditional flow regime. These measures forbid the transfer of the data abroad unless certain conditions 
are fulfilled. If the conditions are stringent, the measure can easily result in a ban to transfer. The 
conditions can apply either to the recipient country (e.g. some jurisdictions require that data can be 
transferred only to countries with an “adequate” level of protection) or to the company (e.g. a condition 
might consist in the need to request the consent of the data subject for the transfer cross-border of his/her 
data). In terms of scoring, if a conditional flow regime is found, it receives a score of 0.5 in case it 
applies to specific data, but it receives a score of 1 in case conditions apply for personal data and or the 
entire sector. The final score is then weighted by 0.25, which is the weight assigned to the category of 
conditional flow regimes.  
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Of note, in certain cases it is not easy to discern whether a measure is a ban to transfer, a local 
processing requirement or a conditional flow regime. In fact, often cases of ban to transfer and local 
processing requirements have certain exceptions which might de facto result in a conditional flow 
regime. When the exceptions are quite wide (for example, if they include the request for consent from 
the data subject), then the measure has been categorized as a conditional flow regime.  
Figure A1 shows a graphical representation of the various levels of data localisation measures taken 
up in this sub-chapter. The direction of the arrow indicates the increased level of restrictiveness. Note 
that conditional flow regime is put outside this conventional sequence of restrictiveness because it 
prevents the flow of data only when the conditions are not fulfilled. Also, note that in Table 1 the ban 
to transfer is put together with local processing requirements although these two measures have actually 
been separated in Figure A1. The point is that the impact of those measures on trade is very similar and 
they are not always easy to discern. Yet, a ban to transfer is generally more restrictive than a local 
processing requirement.  
Figure A1: Graphical overview of data policies 
 
Source: Ferracane (2017) 
1.2 Sub-index on domestic use of data 
The sub-index on domestic use of data index covers a series of subcategories of policies affecting the 
domestic use of data. These are: (i) data retention requirements, (ii) subject rights on data privacy, (iii) 
administrative requirements on data privacy, (iv) sanctions for non-compliance, and finally, (v) other 
restrictive practices related to data policies. Given that each of these sub-categories contains, in turn, 
additional sub-categories, they will be presented separately. For the calculation of the sub-index, the 
weights assigned to the categories are shown in Table 3. The categories with the highest weights (and 
therefore those which are considered to create higher costs for digital trade) are data retention and 
administrative requirements on data privacy, which are assigned a weight of 0.15 each. The category of 
subject rights on data privacy is assigned a score of 0.1, while the other two categories of sanctions for 
non-compliance and other restrictive practices are assigned a score of 0.05. 
The sum of the scores of these categories can go up to 0.5 that reflect a situation of virtually closed 
regime on domestic use of data. The sub-index therefore goes from 0 (completely open) to 0.5 (virtually 
closed). As mentioned above, the data policy index is measured as the sum of the two sub-indexes and 
therefore the score for the final data policy index goes from 0 to 1. 
1.2.1 Data retention 
The first category belonging to the sub-index on domestic use of data deals with measures related to 
data retention, which are measures regulating how and for how long a company should keep certain data 
within its premises. Data retention measures can define a minimum period of retention or a maximum 
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period of retention. In the first case, the companies (often telecommunication companies) are required 
to retain a set of data of their users for a certain period, which can go up to two years or more in some 
cases. These measures can be quite costly for the companies and they are assigned a weight of 0.7. On 
the other hand, the measures imposing a maximum period of retention are somewhat less restrictive and 
prescribe the company not to retain certain data when it is not needed anymore for providing their 
services. They are therefore given a weight of 0.3. The country receives a score of 1 in each of the two 
sub-categories when there is a one or more measures implemented, while 0 is assigned in case of absence 
of these measures. Therefore, if a country implements one or more data retention requirements for a 
minimum period of time and no data retention requirements for a maximum period of time, the score 
will be 0.7. Alternatively, if the country only implements one requirement of maximum period of data 
retention, the score will be 0.3.  
1.2.2 Subject rights on data privacy 
The second category belonging to the sub-index on domestic use of data includes measures related to 
subject rights on data privacy. The rights of the data subject are often a legitimate goal in itself, but they 
can nonetheless represent a cost for the firm when they are implemented disproportionately or in a 
discriminatory manner. This is the reason why they are covered in the database. However, they only 
form a smaller part of the sub-index with a weight of 0.1 as their cost on business is significantly low 
compared with other measures. Two categories of measures are identified regarding data subject rights, 
which are (i) the need for consent for the collection and use of data (with a weight of 0.5) and (ii) the 
right to be forgotten (with also a weight of 0.5). 
If one of the measures applies, a score of 1 is given whereas a score of 0 is assigned otherwise. 
Regarding the first measure on the request of consent for the collection and use of data, a score of 1 is 
given only when the process for requesting consent is considered as disproportionately burdensome. 
This is the case when the consent has to be always written and explicit or when consent is required not 
only for the collection of data, but also for any transfer of data outside the collecting company. If this is 
not the case, then a score of 0 is assigned. Additionally, important to note is that, if the consent is required 
only in case of transfer across borders, this measure is instead reported in the first sub-index under 
conditional flow regime and scored accordingly.  
1.2.3 Administrative requirements on data privacy 
The third category belonging to the sub-index on domestic use of data covers administrative 
requirements on data privacy. Measures included in this category are (i) the requirement to perform a 
data privacy impact assessment (DPIA) (with a weight of 0.3), (ii) the requirement to appoint a data 
protection officer (DPO) (with as well a weight of 0.3), (iii) the requirement to notify the data protection 
authority in case of a data breach (with a weight of 0.1), and finally (iv) the requirement to allow the 
government to access the personal data that is collected (with also a weight of 0.3).  
For the scoring, the first two measures receive a score of 1 when a measure applies and 0 otherwise. 
In the case of the fourth measure, which is the requirement to allow government to access collected 
personal data, a full score of 1 is assigned only when the government has an open access to data in at 
least one sector of the economy. However, if a government has only access to escrow or encryption 
keys, but still notifies access to the data, an intermediate score of 0.7 is assigned. Government direct 
access to data handled by the company or the use of escrow keys may in fact create remarkable consumer 
dissatisfaction that may lead to the user’s termination of service demand. Finally, if the government has 
to follow the same procedure that it would follow for offline access to data - that is, the presence of a 
court decision or a warrant, or when the request follows a judicial investigation process - then the score 
is 0. 
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1.2.4 Sanctions for non-compliance 
The fourth category belonging to the sub-index on domestic use of data examines measures which 
impose a sanction for non-compliance. These measures cover both pecuniary and penal sanctions with 
a weight of 0.5 for each of them. The pecuniary sanctions are not considered a restriction per se, but 
their presence is listed in the database and accounted for in the sub-index when (i) they are above 
250,000 EUR; (ii) companies have explicitly complained about disproportionately high fines or 
discriminatory enforcement of sanctions; (iii) they are expressed as a percentage of a company’s 
domestic or global turnover. In fact, in all these cases, the sanctions have the capacity of putting a 
company out of business and might play an important role in the economic calculation of a company. 
We also list under this section those instances in which the infringement of data privacy rules can be 
sanctioned by closing down the business. On the other hand, the application of penal sanctions such as 
jail-time as a result of infringement of data privacy rules is included in the database as a restriction. 
Instances in which penal sanctions are assigned as a result of identity theft and similar illegal actions are 
obviously not included. For what concerns the scoring, if these cases are identified, a score of 1 is 
assigned.  
1.2.5 Other measures 
Finally, the last category takes up all those measures which are related to domestic use of data, but do 
not fit under any of the aforementioned categories. All these measures are assigned a score of 1.  
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Annex B: Additional Tables and Figures 
Table B1: Number of firms by year 
Year Manufacturing Services Total Percent 
2010 149,547 415,722 565,269 15.97 
2011 156,246 440,857 597,103 16.86 
2012 162,064 461,083 623,147 17.60 
2013 162,346 461,735 624,081 17.63 
2014 155,824 438,194 594,018 16.78 
2015 142,062 394,882 536,944 15.17 
Total 928,089 2,612,473 3,540,562 100 
Source: ORBIS. Note: sample contains only firms that have at least 4 years of data. 
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Table B2: Sector division with frequency numbers of firms from ORBIS in TFP dataset 
NACE  
2-digit 
Sector description Frequency Percent 
10 Food products 111,531 3.15 
11, 12 Beverages; Tobacco products 14,663 0.41 
13 Textiles 29,326 0.83 
14 Wearing apparel 37,617 1.06 
15 Leather and related products 21,363 0.60 
16 Wood and products of wood and cork expect furniture 45,600 1.29 
17 Paper and paper products 18,562 0.52 
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 35,084 0.99 
19, 20 Coke and refined petroleum products; Chemical and products 34,031 0.96 
21 Basic pharmaceuticals products and preparations 6,655 0.19 
22 Rubber and plastic products 51,632 1.46 
23 Other non-metallic mineral products 47,803 1.35 
24 Basic metals 19,811 0.56 
25 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 168,577 4.76 
26 Computer, electronic and optical products 31,227 0.88 
27 Electrical equipment 33,965 0.96 
28 Machinery and equipment nec. 85,449 2.41 
29 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 23,791 0.67 
30 Other transport equipment 8,012 0.23 
31 Furniture 37,925 1.07 
32 Other manufacturing 28,637 0.81 
33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 36,828 1.04 
Total Manufacturing 928,089 26.21 
Source: ORBIS. Note: for the production functions estimates, some countries are grouped together due to 
unreported or insufficient data, as explained in the main text. Malta and Cyprus are not included in TFP estimates. 
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Sector description Frequency Percent 
35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 15,215 0.43 
36-39 Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation  36,498 1.03 
41-43 Construction 446,370 12.61 
45 Wholesale and retail trade of motor vehicles 163,692 4.62 
46 Wholesale trade (except motor vehicles) 498,200 14.07 
47 Retail trade (except motor vehicles) 375,346 10.60 
49-53 Transportation and storage 212,404 6.00 
55 Accommodation 67,668 1.91 
56 Food and beverage service activities 156,362 4.42 
58-63 Information and communication 130,534 3.69 
64 Financial and insurance activities 37,677 1.06 
68 Real estate activities 80,440 2.27 
69 Legal and accounting activities 64,300 1.82 
70 Activities of head offices, management consultancy 42,092 1.19 
71 Architectural and engineering activities 77,312 2.18 
72 Scientific research and development 8,549 0.24 
73 Advertising and market research 30,659 0.87 
74, 75 Other professional, scientific, technical services, Veterinary act. 30,122 0.85 
77 Rental and leasing activities 19,378 0.55 
78 Employment activities 10,488 0.30 
79 Travel agency, tour operator reservation activities 17,906 0.51 
80 Security and investigation activities 12,464 0.35 
81 Services to buildings and landscape activities 41,499 1.17 
82 Office administrative, office support, other business 37,298 1.05 
Total Services  2,612,473 73.79 
Total Manufacturing 928,089 26.21 
Total All  3,540,562 100 
Source: ORBIS. Note: for the production functions estimates, some countries are grouped together due to 
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Table B4: Number of firms by country 
Country Manufacturing Services Total Percent 
BG 29,296 98,214 127,510 3.60 
CZ 51,902 147,513 199,415 5.63 
ES 155,304 516,348 671,652 18.97 
FI 13,314 48,350 61,664 1.74 
FR 47,526 211,051 258,577 7.30 
HR 16,900 72,150 89,050 2.52 
HU 27,461 80,101 107,562 3.04 
IT 214,400 357,456 571,856 16.15 
PL 3,178 7,102 10,280 0.29 
PT 73,469 227,719 301,188 8.51 
RO 82,660 295,712 378,372 10.69 
SI 16,246 44,065 60,311 1.70 
SK 20,812 62,895 83,707 2.36 
AT, DE 14,679 30,212 44,891 1.27 
DK, SE 38,818 164,639 203,457 5.75 
EE, LV 8,782 31,829 40,611 1.15 
GB, IE 31,675 93,714 125,389 3.54 
KR, JP 66,136 80,946 147,082 4.15 
BE, NL, LU 15,531 42,457 57,988 1.64 
Total 928,089 2,612,473 3,540,562 100 
Source: ORBIS. Notes: Malta and Cyprus are not included in TFP estimates.  
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Table B5: Correlation regressions between directly reported and indirectly computed material 
inputs for countries included firms 
  Manufacturing  Services 
Indirect materials 1.060*** 0.964*** 1.052*** 0.936*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -1.355***  -1.546***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
     
Observations 1688641 1688641 5326375 5326375 
R2 0.918 0.998 0.717 0.990 
Note: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Table B7: Summary statistics of variables used in production function 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Var Kurtosis 
ln(Y) 12.706 1.631 5.792 25.205 2.660 4.165 
ln(L) 2.584 1.194 1.099 13.193 1.426 5.179 
ln(K) 11.910 2.086 3.173 26.527 4.352 3.441 
ln(M) 13.597 1.872 6.774 26.155 3.506 3.521 
ln(Inv) 4.053 2.029 -1.792 19.645 4.119 3.436 
Note: Y denotes the value-added, K denotes capital and is computed using the Perpetual 
Inventory Method (PIM)., L denotes the number of employees, M denotes materials and 
Inv denotes investments. All variables have used sectoral deflators.  
Table B8: Summary statistics of TFP estimates and labour productivity 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Var Kurtosis 
ACF  8.781 1.207 0.187 19.811 1.457 3.265 
L&P  9.709 1.283 -0.148 20.780 1.647 3.961 
O&P 8.251 1.632 -24.106 22.114 2.663 6.492 
TFPR  -0.337 0.831 -12.434 7.119 0.691 7.506 
TFPQ -0.751 1.231 -16.440 8.473 1.515 5.877 
LabPr 10.131 1.021 -1.237 19.028 1.042 4.538 
Note: The TFP measures from Ackerberg et al. (2015) is for ACF; Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) for L&P; Olley and Pakes (1996) for O&P; Hsieh and Klenow (2009; 2014) for 
TFPR and TFPQ; and value-added per employee used for LabPr. All productivity 
measures are put in logs. 
Table B9: Pairwise correlation table between the TFP measures 
  ACF L&P O&P  TFPR TFPQ LabPr 
ACF 1.000           
L&P 0.821 1.000     
O&P  0.752 0.780 1.000    
TFPR 0.132 0.366 0.346 1.000   
TFPQ 0.198 0.539 0.387 0.847 1.000  
LabPr 0.713 0.873 0.696 0.347 0.484 1.000 
Note: The TFP measures from Ackerberg et al. (2015) is for ACF; Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) for L&P; Olley and Pakes (1996) for O&P; Hsieh and Klenow (2009; 
2014) for TFPR and TFPQ; and value-added per employee used for LabPr. All 
productivity measures are put in logs. 
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Table B10: Summary country, sector and firm-level variables 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Kurtosis 
  Firm-level variables 
ln(employees) 2.584 1.196 1.099 13.193 5.179 
Number of patents per employee 0.014 0.444 0 185.14 85861.17 
Number of recorded subsidiaries 0.549 5.525 0 1212 15413.91 
Different affiliate activity than firm 0.147 0.354 0 1 4.939 
Servicified firms (S) 0.021 0.144 0 1 46.19 
  Sector-level variable 
ln(D/L)  1.108 1.633 -2.046 6.168 6.433 
ln(S/L) 2.096 1.063 -0.608 7.396 5.327 
(D/IN) 0.032 0.041 0.002 0.378 21.83 
(S/IN) 0.100 0.063 0.015 0.438 5.908 
NMR  0.378 0.207 0 1 2.426 
  Country-level variable 
Data policy 0.320 0.080 0.185 0.530 2.050 
Data policy CB 0.149 0.037 0.125 0.250 3.530 
Data policy DOM 0.171 0.068 0.060 0.290 1.842 
NRI 0.000 0.612 -1.149 1.453 2.544 
Note: The sector-level variables of intensities, i.e. ln(D/L), ln(S/L), (D/IN) and (S/IN) are 
sourced from the BEA 2007 IO Use Table and BLS, but concorded into NACE Rev. 2 4-
digit level. Therefore, summary statistics are shown at NACE Rev. 2 4-digit level. NMR 
denotes the Non-Manufacturing Regulations policies in services sectors from the OECD’s 
PMR and is sector-specific but aggregated to country-level in the regressions. CB denotes 
Cross-Border and covers all policies outlined under 1.1 in Annex A. DOM denotes Domestic 
and covers all policies outlined under 1.2 in Annex A. The variable NRI denotes the Network 
Readiness Indicator from the WEF and is used in its demeaned version in the regressions.  
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Figure B1: Kernel density estimate Data Policy variable 
 
Source: Ferracane et al. (2018). The Kernel density estimate is done for the overall Data Policy variables as 
taken up in all regressions with N=65*6 for all countries and years covered in the DTRI. 
 
Figure B2: Kernel density estimate ln(D/L) * Data Policy 
 
Source: Ferracane et al. (2018) for Data policy. The Kernel density estimate is done for the overall Data Policy 
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Table B11: Firm-level control variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  TFP TFP TFP TFP 
     
ln(employees) 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of patents per employee 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of recorded subsidiaries 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Different affiliate activity than firm 0.163*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.163*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
FE Country-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE Sector-Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 3516012 3516012 3516012 3516012 
R2A 0.866 0.865 0.866 0.866 
R2W 0.023 0.015 0.022 0.023 
RMSE 0.444 0.445 0.444 0.444 
Note: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is in logs and follows 
Ackerberg et al. (2015). The columns of this table follow the order of the baseline 
regression specifications as presented in Table 6. Robust standard errors two-way 
clustered at the country-industry-year and firm level. Fixed effects for sector is applied 
at NACE Rev. 2 4-digit level.  
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Table B12: Top 10 sectors with highest and lowest data use over labour ratio, ln(D/L), using the 
US Census ICT Survey for the year 2010 
NACE 
Rev. 2 
Sector description ln(D/L) 
Highest 
47 Retail trade 4.32 
63 Information services activities 1.88 
10 Food products 1.67 
58 Publishing activities 1.53 
60 Programming and broadcasting activities 1.12 
19 Coke and refined petroleum products 1.04 
66 Activities auxiliary to finance and insurance services 1.00 
62 Computer programming, consultancy and related 0.96 
29 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.82 
32 Other manufacturing 0.79 
Lowest 
80 Security and investigation activities -1.77 
14 Wearing apparel -1.78 
43 Specialized construction activities -1.80 
41 Construction of buildings -1.81 
42 Civil engineering -1.81 
56 Food and beverages services -2.00 
38 Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities -2.07 
39 Remediation activities and other waste management -2.26 
12 Tobacco products -2.53 
15 Leather and related products -2.72 
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